Politics after Violence

Legacies of the Shining Path Conflict in Peru

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We have two objectives in this chapter. The first is to describe the mutations of the Peruvian Right during the last three decades; that is, the transformation of a Right organized around traditional political parties but without ideological cohesiveness into a new Right that we call the "conservative archipelago." This new Peruvian Right did not develop organic organizations, but it is strongly cohesive in ideological terms. Its main agenda is to defend the neoliberal economic model that emerged with the 1993 constitution. Despite party and electoral weakness, the Peruvian Right has effectively defended its interests during periods in which national circumstances could have propelled changes in the country's handling of the economy. This could have occurred, for example, during the geopolitical period when several Latin American countries shifted to the Left, but the conservative archipelago has been and still is the main political force in contemporary Peru. The second objective is to assess the extent to which this transformation and consolidation is related to Peru's Internal Armed Conflict (IAC) from 1980 to 1995. To meet these two objectives, we will proceed as follows. After showing the transformation of the Peruvian Right over the last three decades, we will establish a theoretical framework and time frame to assess the potential impact of the IAC on this transformation. This is followed by an empirical assessment of the alleged relationship. Finally, we conclude by framing the transformation of the Peruvian Right in the Latin American context.
and the new Movimiento Libertad) embodied a liberal and neoliberal right-wing party project.

Still, this model of a liberal Right proved fleeting, since the election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990 gave rise to a new type of Right: one that was economically neoliberal but politically illiberal. The first two years of the 1990s were a critical juncture for the Peruvian Right. Fujimori’s autogolpe in 1992, and the success of his administration in stabilizing Peru’s economy and quelling insurrection, served to legitimize the combination of neoliberal economic policies and the illiberal approach to politics and institutions. Not surprisingly, Vargas Llosa unleashed a fierce critique of it: “What a dictatorship can lead you to is, provisionally, a type of growth that is more or less biological, statistical: rather than comprehensive development, which includes the field of education, of culture, of the democratization of society and its values” (Hildebrand 2008, 333). Yet the model Vargas Llosa criticized was about to endure, in both spirit and actions. It entailed the development of a Right based on personalistic politics, without parties, but with great ideological cohesion regarding the neoliberal economic model established by the 1993 constitution. Whereas in the 1980s industrial sectors linked to right-wing parties could boycott neoliberal measures, in the 1990s and thereafter they would be denounced and stigmatized as “mercantilistic” actors and agendas.

To illustrate the differences on economic matters between the conservative archipelago, which has prevailed in Peru for the past two decades, and the old partisan Right of the 1980s, it is worth highlighting two cases. In 2013, President Ollanta Humala proposed that the state purchase some shares in the Spanish energy company Repsol, which has considerable operations in Peru, in a weak attempt to change the course of the country’s neoliberal economy. The right-wing opposition was unanimous, with a striking level of cohesion and reach, in its rejection of this proposal. First, most of the print and television media constantly attacked the initiative. Second, the most important factor in dissuading the government from following the aforementioned path came from within its own ranks. Humala’s minister of the economy, an official with several years of service in the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, was against the measure and convinced the president not to pursue it (Uceda and Rivera 2013). In conclusion, the Peruvian Right succeeded in neutralizing an antineoliberal endeavor with considerable ideological cohesion despite being weak in organizational terms. This Right, effective in defending the economic status quo through an ideological unity that belies its organizational fragmentation, is what we call the “conservative archipelago.” Ideologically, the conservative archipelago advocates maintaining the economic order that emerged and was institutionalized with the 1993 constitution. Organizationally, it is composed of six types of actors (the “islands”): three of them are political and institutional, and the other three are social.

The first group of actors consists of several traditional political parties (especially the PPC and APRA) that no longer play a prominent role as parties with societal roots. Instead, they have become what we call partidos-bancadas whose existence and activity is limited to a discredited legislature with little relevance in Peruvian politics and policy (Valladares 2012). Second, fujimismo, which also shares the partido-bancada characteristics, has become an effective party brand capable of competing in national elections and projecting a presence, albeit a weak one, in the subnational arena. The third important group of political and institutional actors to defend the conservative agenda is the technocrats and bureaucrats. Having controlled the state for many years, they have managed to institutionalize and defend neoliberal practices without being challenged by the increasingly weak politicians (Vergara and Encinas 2016).

In addition, there are three “social” islands in the conservative archipelago. First, there are the business associations, which have great influence in the state and on public opinion, especially through the Confederation of Private Businesses and Institutions (La Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas, or CONFIEP). Second, over the last two decades the Catholic Church—especially through the very public and vocal Cardinal Juan Luis Cipriani—has played a decisive role in defending the status quo. Finally, most of the Lima-based national media has exerted great influence since becoming ardent supporters of the Peruvian economic model.

In sum, there is an archipelago consisting of six actors who, in an ideologically cohesive but organically fragmented manner, uphold the economic system that emerged in early 1993. As seen in the example of the state’s failed attempt to purchase shares in Repsol (as well as in several other more everyday dynamics), the conservative archipelago is sufficiently effective to defend and institutionalize the prevailing economic order in contemporary Peru. Thus, a neoliberal consensus that is not politically liberal is what unifies this Peruvian Right. The origin of the conservative archipelago—the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori—was therefore a critical juncture that ushered in
a cohesive neoliberal Right, while the defeat of the FREDEMO Project in 1990 closed off the path for a comprehensive liberal Right. And the path that the juncture opened is directly linked to the IAC of the 1980s. But how? That is the subject of the next section.

The Internal Conflict and the Transformation of the Peruvian Right

In a country with a tradition of institutional weakness where the rules change rapidly and frequently (Levitsky and Murillo 2009), the emergence, survival, and entrenchment of the neoliberal economic model, as well as the overwhelming consensus around it, is a peculiar occurrence in Peruvian history. Since the early twentieth century, the implementation of national projects was constantly interrupted and/or thwarted. Thus, the neoliberal project, constitutionalized in 1993, has acquired remarkable stability.

Before continuing with the analysis of the transformation mentioned in the previous section, two things should be made clear. First, the neoliberal economic model was highly successful in transforming Peru, and the plan largely fulfilled its promises (Vergara 2013). This success explains why politicians and large segments of the population have united to maintain it. But (and secondly), the implementation of the neoliberal model came after not only the economic disaster of the 1980s but also the IAC of that same decade. These crises were strongly entangled together. Therefore, to what extent did the violence of the 1980s influence the transformation of the Peruvian Right? As with all the outcomes analyzed in this book, it is difficult to isolate the effects that arose out of the economic crisis from those that arose out of the IAC.

To analyze the links between the IAC and the transformation of the Peruvian Right, this study is organized around the framework suggested in the book's introduction. First, we look at the open IAC period, between 1980 and 1990. Second, we focus on the resolution of the IAC between 1990 and 1995. Finally, we look at the post-conflict period from 1995 to the present. In each stage, we show the mechanisms that allowed the transformation of the Peruvian Right. In particular, we emphasize the relationship between the IAC and the destruction of the traditional partisan Right, along with the gradual construction of the conservative archipelago.

The IAC and Partisan Destruction (1980–1990)

Political parties have two types of assets: material assets and ideological assets (Hale 2006). This categorization allows us to observe the first part of the transformation of the Peruvian Right. During the IAC, the main assets of the Peruvian right-wing parties were severely damaged, which laid the foundations for the formation of the “conservative archipelago.” We begin by showing the damage to material assets, followed by the damage to ideological assets. This first stage is significant in the destruction of the traditional Right, but not for the formation of the new Right.

As explained in detail in the opening chapters of this book, the violence experienced during the 1980s was brutal. The conflict that started with the Shining Path’s (SP) declaration of war against the Peruvian state caused more destruction than any other Latin American armed movement (Degregori 2010). The SP’s offensive plan involved “the murder of local authorities: mayors, governors, lieutenant governors, and justices of the peace, and national authorities: ministers, parliamentarians and other representatives of the state” (CVR 2004). The goal of the SP was to “create a power vacuum so that they could establish control over the population more easily” (CVR 2003a, 6:16) Clearly, this had consequences for the entire country, including its multiple sectors and actors. Chapters 7 and 8 in this volume show the considerable consequences of the IAC for the Left and for civil society. But what was the cost for the right-wing parties?

Let us begin with the erosion of material assets. First, according to the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, or CVR), 12 percent of those killed or missing during the IAC caused by the SP4 were authorities.5 When local leaders are included in the category, the CVR shows that authorities represented 17 percent of the total dead or missing6 and 21 percent of the SP’s victims.7 This means that after peasants, authorities were the group most affected by the violence. Most of these authorities “were members of political parties that supported the democratic regime inaugurated in 1980,”8 so the fatalities represented “a heavy blow to the capacity for political mediation in areas affected by the internal armed conflict” (CVR 2003a, 1:169). The AP, the PPC, and APRA bore the brunt of the attacks, but it is even more difficult to quantify the SP’s direct threats and damage caused in areas under military control. For example, according to a former APRA secretary, around a
Table 9.1. Main targets of terrorist activity during the 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>May 1980 to July 1985</th>
<th>July 1986 to June 1988</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political party offices</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police stations</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-voltage towers</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special projects</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDES</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric power plants</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registers of electors</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlements*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>2,417</td>
<td>3,703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defense; compiled by the authors based on DESC0 1989.
*“Centro poblado” in Spanish.

Table 9.2. Attacks on right-wing political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of representative cases, 1980–1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on party offices and property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on homes and private property of authorities, leaders, and members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations and assassination attempts against party leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations and assassination attempts against authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations and assassination attempts against party members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DESC0 1989; compiled by the author.
*Classifications made by the authors. Party property includes vehicles; private property includes local businesses; party leaders includes previous authorities; and party members include candidates.

In short, the material assets of political parties were weakened severely during the course of the IAC, in which party offices, leaders, and members were constantly targeted by the SP. Thus, the violence weakened the standing of these political parties so that they struggled to compete electorally, especially in local and rural areas. Additionally, the SP was able to establish its presence and operate in large regions of the country, particularly where the state was absent or largely ineffective, thus building alternative structures of authority [. . .] that sometimes challenged and sometimes replaced the state” (Burt 2004, 249). Furthermore, toward the end of the 1980s, 32 percent of Peruvian territory and 49 percent of the population was under military control (Degregori 2010). According to Javier Díaz Oribuela, an AP leader, “terrorism had a strong impact on our ability to get elected.”

In addition to damaging the material assets of political parties, the IAC also affected their legitimacy. The deterioration of the country’s political and economic climate during the 1980s gradually led to a general perception that these parties, through their elected officials, were incapable of governing (Tanaka 1998, 54). This was particularly
evident during the APRA administration from 1985 to 1990 when the government was unable to solve the crisis, and in fact aggravated it in every possible way. Beginning in 1988, the economic crisis escalated, and the country’s collapse created desperate conditions in which opportunities abounded for SL to recruit new fighters and supporters (M. Smith 1992). As the institutional weakness of the state worsened and inflation soared, the myth of “Sendero ganador” grew stronger (Chávez 2012). Thus, APRA’s failure was instrumental in promoting widespread rejection of political parties and further delegitimizing an entire institutional structure unable to fulfill even the most basic duties of the constitutional state.

The political parties’ difficulties led to poor electoral outcomes at the national and subnational levels. For example, the AP’s performance at the municipal level illustrates its growing disconnect with the public: in 1980, it won 100 provinces (67.1 percent) and 814 districts (57.1 percent); in 1983, this number dropped to 36 provinces (23.2 percent) and 465 districts (32.1 percent); and in 1986, there were no AP candidates running in any part of the country. All of this foreshadowed its disastrous results of the 1985 general election (G. Ruiz et al. 2013). According to Kenney (2004), in the 1986 municipal elections, the four traditional parties together lost only 8 percent of the national vote. However, in the following elections of 1989, this number increased to 29 percent. During that vote, the last of the 1980s, the country’s capital experienced a shock when an outsider, the broadcaster Ricardo Belmont, won the coveted Lima mayoral race against the FREDEMO candidate, the AP’s Juan Incháustegui. Thus, the partisan liberal-right was defeated by a new, personalistic politics based on nonorganizational ties with the electorate. It would not be the last time this would occur.

In 1990, Alberto Fujimori used social unrest as a weapon against the political parties that had pushed the country toward economic failure. At the same time, the unsuccessful fight against the SP led voters to seek stronger government (Crabtree 2010, 364). Thus, the renewed economic ideas that Vargas Llosa introduced to the Peruvian Right were not enough to restore the strength of the parties, which slowly crumbled throughout the 1980s as voters looked on. The IAC was conducive to the formation of the contemporary conservative archipelago, since the conflict eroded the material and ideological foundations of the previous representative order. This entailed the destruction of party infrastructure, intimidation and assassination of party leaders and competitive candidates, replacement of democratic rules in certain areas of the country, and punishment by voters of deficient governmental handling of the crisis (and, often, aggravation of that crisis). Ultimately, this total collapse prevented the economically and politically liberal Right, represented by Vargas Llosa and backed by parties with democratic credentials, from obtaining power.

Conflict Resolution and the Emergence of the Archipelago (1990–1995)

The resolution of the IAC, a crucial moment for the formation of the conservative archipelago, occurred in parallel with the establishment of Alberto Fujimori’s government, the April 1992 self-coup, and the approval of the 1993 constitution. The weakened parties were defeated during this period, while the political and institutional foundations were laid for the new conservative ideology and its islands of support.

The resolution of the IAC came at the hands of a neopopulist and neoliberal outsider, and led to the collapse of the right-wing parties. Here, an important distinction must be made between the Peruvian Right and the Left vis-à-vis the armed conflict. The Left was greatly affected by the unfolding of the conflict in the 1980s. However, by 1989, before Fujimori appeared on the national political scene, the Peruvian Left was already weakening “autonomously.” Initially, the Left was divided by an insurmountable rift between those who denounced the SL and those who sought to appease it (M. Smith 1992; Rénique 2004). Once it had been divided in two, the Left won only 7 of the 42 district municipalities of Lima in the 1989 elections—after having held 21 of them in the middle of the decade. Then, in the 1990 general elections, the Left managed to place only 9 senators and 20 deputies in power (out of a total of 60 and 180, respectively), well below the numbers of the AP, APRA, PPC, and Cambio 90 (Alberto Fujimori’s first party brand). Thus, the Left’s breakdown was already underway well before Fujimori’s authoritarianism took root. Indeed, the resolution of the IAC by Fujimori did not do much to weaken the partisan or electoral Left, but it did weaken the societal Left. This allowed the SL to easily absorb the Left’s weakened foundations on the peripheries of Lima and Peru, instilling a sense of fear in unions and other sectors of organized civil society (Burt 1997).

The Right experienced the opposite. Until 1992, right-wing parties
were electorally successful, having had 20 senators and 62 deputies in power in addition to holding 82 provincial municipalities (nearly twice the number of the left-wing platform Izquierda Unida holdings). But Fujimori’s consolidation of power destroyed the right-wing parties. They went from being the most important coalition within national and subnational representative institutions to overall collapse following the autogolpe of 1992. Still, unlike the Left, the societal Right was strengthened during this period. Thus, the resolution of the IAC and the emergence of Fujimori’s authoritarianism led to inverse outcomes for the Right and Left: on the one hand, Fujimori did not eliminate the partisan Left (it had already started to break down by itself) but did erode the societal Left; on the other hand, he destroyed the partisan Right but revived the societal Right. With that, the brief Vargasilossian liberal-rightist experiment came to an end, and the formation of the conservative archipelago began.

The resolution of the IAC explains the difference in outcomes. Between July 1992 and July 1993, the SL’s leaders were killed or captured. Abimael Guzmán was caught in September 1992 and petitioned the government to grant his surrender a year later. The conflict, which had seemed destined to endure, ended more quickly than anyone had foreseen. And once the myth of “Sendero ganador” had been shattered, popularity soared for the figure responsible for the demise of the SP and his anti-republican form of government. This had direct and indirect consequences for the Right, ultimately hastening the dissipation of the partisan Right and paving the way for the new conservative archipelago.

First, the defeat of the SL (along with the stabilization of inflation and Peru’s reintegration into the international financial community) allowed Fujimori to style himself as the personification of an effective Right. Two decades earlier, General Juan Velasco had accomplished something similar with the reformist parties. Velasco implemented the land reform by authoritarian means and borrowed other measures from the agenda of the reformist parties (APRA, AP, Democracia Cristiana), which had never implemented them, thus stripping them of their reformist legitimacy and eroding their ideological bases. Similarly, Fujimori successfully adopted the right-wing agenda, stressing security and economic order. Like Velasco, Fujimori added an anti-party rhetoric to his authoritarian efficacy, which was instrumental in the collapse of the right-wing parties. According to the AP leader Víctor Andrés García Belaunde, who was a congressman unt
the decade. When the regional governments dissolved after the 1992 coup and the Transitory Councils of Regional Administration (Consejos Transitorios de Administración Regional, or CTAR) were set up in their place, each council president was appointed on Cipriani’s recommendation: “Monsignor Cipriani was Fujimori’s personal representative in Ayacucho” (Pasara 2014, 16). In short, the IAC era forged a Church with *fujimorista* tendencies and experience defending conservative political positions in the public sphere.

Finally, the IAC and the undemocratic manner of its resolution created favorable conditions for the endurance of the new economic regime that accompanied the 1993 constitution. The remarkable continuity and stability of the Peruvian economic model would seem to support the idea that institutional arrangements tend to endure when their supporters completely defeat the opponents of the new institutions (Przeworski 1991). In fact, if the stability of the neoliberal institutional arrangements were compared with the mechanisms and actors responsible for the frustration of similar reforms in the 1980s, one would note the substantial differences that occurred in Peru over a short period of time. One would observe that the right-wing parties disappeared; the organizations and politicians of the protectionist Right were swept away; a body of neoliberal technocrats embedded themselves in a state which constrained itself; the partisan Left committed suicide; the unions were demobilized; the SP requested a peace deal from Fujimori’s government; and lastly, the *fujimorista* brand made its entry into Peruvian politics. These, and especially the dissolution of the liberal Right and the birth of a conservative archipelago, are the lasting political legacies of the resolution of the IAC.


In a text published in 2000, Catherine Conaghan accurately foresaw the future of the post-Fujimori Peruvian Right. She predicted that with the foundations for a right-wing style of government established, the fall of Fujimori would not result in the restoration of the old partisan Right in Peru. Indeed, after Fujimori fell, the conservative archipelago became autonomous from the government that had created it and shaped a new, nonpartisan way of defending the 1993 economic model. In this section, we examine the consolidation of the conserva-

tive archipelago and how it relates to the IAC. Then, we assess the dispute of political discursion surrounding the IAC. In other words, we look at the struggles over legacies, or the way actors used and shaped the IAC based on their political preferences.

When Alberto Fujimori was reelected in 1995 with more than 60 percent of the vote, the international community accepted that the government had been democratically purified of the original authoritarian sin of 1992. After then, the conservative archipelago was consolidated through a community of ideologically cohesive actors who defended the new economic model that came with the 1993 constitution, but who had no organizational umbrella or party.

During the second half of Fujimori’s government, the weakness of the political parties and the relationship between the executive and the legislature, which survived the fall of the Fujimori regime, were consolidated. In other words, “rampant presidentialism” (Morón and Sanborn 2007) and the subordinate role of the legislative branch (Degregori and Meléndez 2007) were established. After the collapse of Fujimori’s government, this subordination continued not because of the actions of a competitive authoritarian regime, but because of the weakness of political parties, which, without societal foundations, became mere “partidos-bancadas” that support or oppose the wishes of the executive without major consequences (Valladares 2012). Thus, the right-wing parties, weakened by the IAC and its resolution as they are, became the unwavering legacy of the post-Fujimori Peruvian democracy, and they now play a limited role in defending the conservative agenda from within the legislature.

Within the general legacy of party weakness, the political coalition that represents *fujimorismo* is a unique case. As recalled by Roberts (2006), *fujimorismo* was not interested in forming a partisan vehicle, and this disinterest carried a high cost when Fujimori fell from grace. However, a decade later—in large part because Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko, was old enough to be a presidential candidate—*fujimorismo* took more of an interest in building a party organization (Urrutia 2011; Navarro 2010). Rather than an institutionalized party, the movement resembles a weak organization supported by a strong memory and a strong and enduring leader in Keiko Fujimori. Urrutia (2011) calls *fujimorismo* no more than a “partisan vehicle.” Following Lupu (2014), we might suggest that *fujimorismo* is limited to being a party brand that enjoys popular support when a member of the Fujimori family runs for office. Keiko Fujimori has reached the sec-
second round of two presidential elections, and she and her brother Kenji have been the Congress members with the most votes in the 2006 and 2011 elections, respectively. However, whenever someone outside the Fujimori family has led the movement, the number of votes won has decreased significantly. As Max Weber (1995) pointed out in his explanation of charisma, only a relative of the providential individual or leader can inherit that leader's charisma. In this case, the inherited charisma of the chosen leader stemmed from the resolution of the IAC by Alberto Fujimori's government. It is defeating terrorism, rather than ending hyperinflation or stabilizing the country's economy, that is 

fujimorismo's biggest electoral asset, as well as the main rallying point for fujimorista members and supporters (Urrutia 2011; Meléndez 2014). A 2009 nationwide survey by Ipsos-Apoyo found that 66 percent of respondents considered the "defeat of terrorism" to be the greatest success of Alberto Fujimori's government, far ahead of the 33 percent who cited "economic stability." In addition, a nationwide survey conducted after the first round of the 2011 presidential elections revealed that 43 percent of those who voted for Keiko Fujimori did so because of "the good government of her father, Alberto Fujimori." Ultimately, Meléndez (2014) refers to these elements of recognition as the birth of political identification or "partisanship."

The enemies of fujimorismo—the "other" that helped give it an identity during the 2000s—are organizations and individuals linked to human rights (Urrutia 2011). In other words, this "other" was composed of actors who would have objected to the resolution of the IAC through the effective "firm hand" approach taken by fujimorismo. Still, neither the institutionalization of fujimorismo nor its material assets are the most important aspects of the movement; they are outweighed by the cohesive force provided by the memory of Alberto Fujimori's government, Keiko Fujimori's repeated strong showings in presidential elections, and the electorate's conception of fujimorismo as a propagated brand of order through a firm approach. In this way, fujimorismo is a dual legacy of the IAC and its resolution. This means that, like all Peruvian political parties which must depend on a civil society weakened by the IAC, fujimorismo is organizationally weak. However, the main appeal of fujimorismo, which unifies members and supporters alike, is as the destroyer of the SL. In the national elections of 2011 and 2016, these assets were linked to the conditions of the early 1990s and recalled through the key issues of security and economic slowdown. Thus, the construction of this partisan brand, with its ability to compete in national elections and play a role alongside other parties in the legislature, became a central island of the Peruvian conservative archipelago.

Furthermore, the technocratic nucleus, which emerged and gained independence after the 1992 coup and the implementation of the neoliberal reforms, endured into the 2000s. Like many legacies, the consolidation of the technocratic core was based on not only the inertia of the 1990s but also decisions made during the post-Fujimori period. It is important to note that Valentin Paniagua's transitional government retained many of the technical plans of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance and of other entities linked to the economic sphere, institutions which were dominated by the experts who delivered the neoliberal reforms years earlier (Dargent 2015). During the government of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), who had no party-political backing, the technocratic sector gained power and became a powerful actor, especially against weak politicians without the leverage needed to influence other strong actors in the Peruvian state (Vergara and Encinas 2016). While significant state technocratization also occurred in other countries, such as Chile and Mexico, in those countries the presence of institutionalized political parties forced technocrats to consult or negotiate with the parties to advance their proposals (P. Silva 2009; Centeno 1997). However, in Peru, the legacy of technocratic strength and autonomy combined with the legacy of party weakness, which allowed the technocrats to become the main actors in the conservative archipelago and in the defense of the 1993 economic model.

Something similar happened in the Catholic Church. If the relationship between Fujimori and the archbishop of Ayacucho was reinforced by the IAC, then the resulting legacy deepened during the post-conflict period, transforming the Church into a central actor in the conservative archipelago. In 1995, Archbishop Cipriani openly defended the laws that absolved military and police officers involved in human rights violations. Then, when the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, or MRTA) stormed the residence of the Japanese ambassador in 1997 and took hundreds hostage, the Peruvian government appointed Cipriani to negotiate with the subversive group. Shortly after, Cipriani became the archbishop of Lima and thus the head of the country's Catholic Church. Following his formal appointment, Cipriani developed ties to political power, both at a personal level and as part of the influence enjoyed by many politicians with links to the Opus Dei (Cipriani's denomina-
Kuczynski’s administration the trend deepened. These figures, then, are relatively stable: the number of ministers who are professional politicians is steadily decreasing, and that of technocrats and/or businessmen is steadily increasing (Vergara and Encinas 2016). Likewise, the role of private organizations in the public sphere remained active and influential. It is undeniable that in several sectors of the state, the business sector became an important veto player (Vergara 2012). In this way, the business sector has become a crucial island of the conservative archipelago and of the defense of the 1993 economic model.

The Struggle over Legacies

Thus far, we have seen that the gradual consolidation and defense of Peru’s neoliberal economic regime is associated with the success of the conservative archipelago, whose formation was the legacy of the IAC and its resolution. A strong conservative Right was consolidated that prioritized the maintenance of market freedom but placed less importance on other freedoms. It was also a Right whose working mechanism within traditional liberal institutions was based more on influence than on public deliberation. In this regard, the formation and consolidation of the conservative archipelago stemmed from the failure of the liberal and institutionalist Right that was active during the 1988–1992 period, in which the convergence of traditional right-wing parties and the new economically liberal Right was proposed. Thus, the defeat of one Right and the consolidation of another is a legacy rooted in Peruvian society and linked to the IAC.

The structuring of the conservative archipelago is the sum of interrelated legacies (ideological and organizational). Still, the different actors of the archipelago utilize the memory the IAC and their interpretation of the conflict to defend the economic order. Of course, this approach is not unique to the conservative archipelago. All actors and sectors of Peruvian politics seek to build their own narrative of the IAC. While the Left was the most successful at building academic and scholarly concern for the violence, the Right has succeeded in vulgarizing and disseminating an interpretation of the conflict in which the Left is linked to the pre-Fujimori economic failure of the country and to the SP chaos. This narrative then allows for a discourse where the defense of the neoliberal model becomes the defense of a country free of terrorism. Thus, in addition to the political and institutional lega-
cies, there is an open and ongoing race to continue building discursive and narrative legacies.

Two recent events in the national political arena facilitate an analysis of how this works. The first example is the 2010 mayoral electoral campaign in Lima. Faced with the possible victory of the leftist candidate Susana Villarán, many islands of the conservative archipelago attacked her with arguments tied to the IAC. The leaders of the partidos-bancadas quickly charged that extremist movements surrounded Villarán. She was accused of having a pact with the MRTA and being surrounded by convicted terrorists, and the front pages of several national newspapers alluded to a nonexistent association between Villarán and Abimael Guzmán. The technocrats also joined in to claim that Villarán's candidacy posed danger. Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, for example, declared that the arrival of extremists to the municipality of Lima would produce “a shock” in the international markets. The Church likewise had its say. Cardinal Cipriani stated with reference to Villarán's candidacy that it was not the right time for ideologies, and that he sensed “a fear, like the one during the period of the Shining Path.” Consequently, Villarán's performance in the opinion polls during the last few days before the election, when these attacks escalated and the electorate took fright, decreased sharply (Tanaka 2010).

This type of discourse, which links terrorism with a challenge to the economic model, recurs whenever social movements emerge in opposition to certain large mining investments. The conflict over the Conga mining project in Cajamarca is a case in point. In 2011, various local and regional actors mobilized against the project. Faced with the danger of losing one of the largest investments projected for the upcoming years in Peru, Ollanta Humala's government, politicians, the media, the Church, and technocrats raised the specter of terrorism and anti-investment. Among the technocrats, a former minister of the environment stated, “these groups, Santos' Patria Roja, Saavedra's MRTA, and Marco Arana's Gruñides group, are extremists. [The protests] will result in a terrorist movement.” Another minister claimed that “Santos and Abimael [Guzmán] have caused the same damage to Cajamarca, Santos even more [. . .] Cajamarca is in a terrible recession.” The fujimorista congressman Octavio Salazar said, “Gregorio Santos acts like a terrorist when he calls for a revolution.” Finally, as always, Cipriani voiced the Church's position, stating that the protesters contained “few groups, but nevertheless terrorists.”

These two examples, coupled with the Repsol case mentioned at the start of this chapter, show how the conservative archipelago acts to defend the 1993 economic order in Peru. There is considerable ideological cohesion surrounding the economic model, even though there is no organic structure that allows different islands to coordinate their statements or actions. Thus, its defenders do not respond to party lines, and they are at once inside and outside the government, and inside and outside the institutions.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined how the IAC and its resolution affected the Peruvian Right. Furthermore, we have shown the ways in which these legacies have facilitated the persistence of the neoliberal economic model that emerged with the 1993 constitution. While much research has been done about the IAC's impact on the Left, its impact on the Right is less studied but just as important. Indeed, we have seen how the Right mutated from a traditional partisan Right with low ideological cohesiveness to a new Right, which lacks organic partisanship but has a group of actors with ideological cohesiveness based on the defense of the neoliberal regime. This is an important transformation borne of the IAC's various legacies. Therefore, one way of providing context to our observation is to offer a comparative perspective: How significant is this transformation within the Latin American region?

Neoliberal reforms were a crucial moment for Latin America that significantly altered the social and political landscapes in many countries. According to Kenneth Roberts (2014), these reforms were a critical juncture that reshaped Latin American political systems. Thus, the Peruvian political system was not the only one fundamentally transformed by the economic crisis of the 1980s and the subsequent introduction of neoliberal reforms. Roberts also states that “neoliberal critical junctures were especially destabilizing where they eroded party-society linkages and blurred the distinctions between major parties” (Roberts 2014, 20). Both phenomena he describes are remarkably close to what happened in Peru. Thus, it is tempting to claim that the neoliberal reforms alone explain the Peruvian case and the transformation of the Right. However, it is important to highlight that Peru is not only a post-Washington consensus country but also a post-conflict country. This certainly does not invalidate Roberts's general thesis regarding Latin America, but it does suggest that the IAC introduced a dose of specificity to the Peruvian case.

The fact that party systems were reshaped (strengthened or weak-
ened) by the neoliberal reforms does not explain the extent of the changes that Peru experienced compared to other countries in similar situations. First, the defeat of the Left and of organized civil society was more resounding in Peru. If neoliberal reforms alone were enough to weaken the Left and civil society everywhere else, the addition of an IAC meant more devastating consequences for Peru. As we have explored in this chapter, the transformation and hegemony of the Right cannot be understood without considering the brutal defeat of the societ Left during the IAC. Moreover, neoliberal reforms led to the technocratization of Latin American states (Grindle 2012), but in few cases other than Peru did technocrats achieve such high levels of isolation and direct influence in the government (Dargent 2013). This technocratic strength is directly linked to the IAC’s resolution and the defeat of right-wing partisan political forces. Perhaps Chile is another case where, like Peru, the technocratic sector achieved autonomy and influence in the wake of an authoritarian government that had emerged following widespread social unrest. Still, even though neoliberal reforms placed more importance on the business sector and weakened political parties everywhere else, both outcomes were more profound in Peru. Furthermore, when the right-wing parties weakened in other countries, it led to the long-term weakening of the right-wing agenda and not to the strengthening that occurred in Peru. Thus, the fragmented but ideologically cohesive islands that form the Peruvian conservative archipelago are significant for their singularity in the Latin America context, beyond the common results that neoliberal reforms tend to produce.

However, the peculiarity of the Peruvian case stems not only from the significant changes caused by the IAC but, above all, from the persistence of these changes over time. The fact that neoliberal reforms fundamentally reshaped party systems did not mean their political systems were frozen. For example, Bolivia and Argentina are like the Peruvian case in that they share the two characteristics, mentioned previously, that Roberts describes as most harmful to party systems. However, in Bolivia and Argentina, the breakdown of the party system subsequently led to a post-neoliberal political life, even though the party system was not fully restored. In Peru the party system was likewise not restored, but in this case a post-neoliberal political life did not emerge. In other words, the Peruvian case is a significant variation within a common pattern for the dismantling of systems of representation. One viewpoint regarding Latin America’s shift to the Left claims that Latin America adopted populism in places where party systems collapsed and outsiders emerged (Kaufman 2011; Flores-Macías 2012). Peru meets both general prerequisites, but they were not crucial there. This is because in this case, the IAC’s unique and dreadful trajectory was added to the well-traveled path of Latin American neoliberal reforms. In Peru, the sticky neoliberal reforms adhered with twice as much intensity. Therefore, the Peruvian conservative archipelago defended neoliberal reforms more successfully than any other South American country because the reforms that emerged were linked to the IAC and its consequences.

Notes

1. Internal Armed Conflict (Conflicto Armado Interno) is the term used by the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, or CVR).
2. For more about the conflicts within the Peruvian Right during the 1980s, see Conaghan and Malloy 1994.
3. In the term “partido-bancada,” partido refers to a political party and bancada refers to a number of congresspersons acting as a group in the legislature.
4. This percentage was calculated by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. CVR 2003a, Conclusion 27.
5. According to the CVR, this label includes both local authorities (such as mayors, governors, lieutenants, and justices of the peace) and national authorities (such as ministers, congressmen, and congresswomen). In other words, it includes state authorities.
6. This percentage was calculated by the authors based on the CVR’s Statistical Appendix (2,359 of 13,470 victims with information for the occupation variable). CVR 2003a, Statistical Appendix, p. 86.
7. This percentage was calculated by the CVR. See CVR 2003a, 1:169.
8. This is a record of the SL’s activity based on reports in national newspapers. In this sense, it should be considered a database of representative cases rather than a database from which exact frequencies can be obtained.
9. We could infer that at least some of the attacks on homes showed in table 9.1 correspond to right-wing authorities, leaders, and party members.
10. Personal interview by the authors of this chapter, May 2014.
11. “Winner Shining Path” refers to the idea that the Shining Path was unbeatable and would win in the war against the state.
12. For more about the way in which Velasco and Fujimori represent two similar movements against civil society and political parties, see chapter 3 of Vergara 2015a.
13. Personal interview, May 2014.
14. As a candidate for the fujimoristas, Martha Chávez obtained only 7.4 percent of the vote in 2006.
15. A September 2012 national survey by IPSOS-Apoyo showed that 50 percent of respondents named Alberto Fujimori as one of the main individuals to have contributed to the demise of the SL.

16. When Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was elected president in 2016, fujimorismo acquired a more prominent role in Congress, having won 55 percent of the congressional vote share. This triggered frequent spats and horse-trading with the executive, but despite all the political noise, little has changed in terms of the cohesiveness of right-wing actors regarding the neoliberal regime.

17. The MRTA launched its struggle against the Peruvian state in 1984, and is responsible for 1.5 percent of the fatalities during the IAC (CVR 2003a).

18. For example, the show was useful in organizing the 2013 “March for Life” in which thousands of people mobilized against all types of abortion, even therapeutic abortion (for medical necessities such as saving the life of the pregnant woman).

19. Roberto Abusada founded the IPE and then became an economic adviser for the government. Jorge Baca was the IPE’s director and then became minister of the economy and finance. Leoni Roca was adviser to the prime minister and later director of the IPE. Fritz Du Bois left his post as an economic adviser for the government to take the position of IPE director (Arce 2005, 45).

20. We examined all the ministers in each ministry from the Toledo government (2001) to Humala’s third cabinet (June 2013); there was a total of 262 incumbents, who were classified as “businessmen,” “politicians,” “technical,” and other such categories.

21. See chapter 11 in this volume.


26. The mining project was approved during Alan García’s government (2006–2011), and with almost US$5 million invested, it should be one Peru’s largest investment projects. The investors are the Newmont Mining Corporation, from the United States (51.35 percent); Buenaventura, from Peru (43.65 percent); and the World Bank as a minority partner through the International Finance Corporation (5 percent).