Chapter 2

The Fujimori Regime through Tocqueville’s Lens: Centralism, Regime Change, and Peripheral Elites in Contemporary Peru

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The authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori (1992–2000) in Peru is the only case of a Latin American country that democratized in the Third Wave and then reverted to authoritarianism. Not only did democracy break down in the coup d’etat of April 5, 1992, but also Fujimori went on to quietly construct an authoritarian regime that survived the entire decade.1 How is it possible that an entire country became subject to Fujimori’s authoritarian rule in an international context that no longer endorsed dictatorships? How did Fujimori’s regime—here referred to as the Fujimorato—acquire its stability?2

This question has already been approached from several perspectives.3 To some scholars, the answer is to be found in the decisions made by rational political actors in the political juncture of the early 1990s. In the context of tense relations between the executive branch and legislature where Fujimori had a minority, Fujimori’s congressmen clashed with the opposition in a dispute that weakened public support for the latter and strengthened the executive (Kenney 2004). By the time of this confrontation, Fujimori had already defeated inflation and amassed considerable popularity, which lowered the costs of ending the democratic regime (Tanaka 1998). After the coup, the Organization of American States set up a dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition in order to facilitate a return to democracy. However, the balance of power was uneven and that situation shaped the future of the regime (López 1994). These explanations are actor-based and privilege the analysis of a brief juncture within very central institutions.
Another approach focuses on social changes that occurred before the Fujimorato. For example, Degregori (1991) showed how, as a candidate, Fujimori embodied an emergent, modern, Peruvian society shaped by migration and the rise of the informal economy. He represented a new and nonliberal modernity that Vargas Llosa, his main rival in the 1990 election, failed to capture. Grompone (1991) and Cameron (1994), in turn, highlighted the changes in the social class structure and the weakened links between this new society and political parties (especially the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and the United Left [IZQUIERDA UNIDA, or the IU]). As the middle and lower classes grew poorer during the 1980s and informal employment increased, class- and labor-based parties saw an erosion of their roots in society. According to these explanations, Fujimori benefited from macro-social changes in Peru that also weakened the main parties.

A third type of explanation emphasizes the role of Peru’s political culture that has a historical propensity to embrace salvadores de la patria (saviors of the nation). According to this view, Fujimori was a new manifestation of the old, vicious cycle of caudillismo. In the words of Hugo Neira (2000) evoking Etienne de la Boetie, Peruvians have repeatedly been seduced into servitude volontaire. This caudillista tendency has always prevented the development of a public sphere favorable to democracy (Murakami 2007). Leaders have always been able to undermine institutions and seduce the electorate because “populism is more than a response to periodic collapse; it is part of the Peruvian political culture” (Crabbte 1999: 68).

In this study, I develop an alternative explanation for the emergence of the Fujimorato using a Tocquevillean theoretical framework. I seek to illuminate aspects of this issue neglected by the three prevailing approaches mentioned above. First, instead of observing a single timeframe (short or long), I seek to articulate both the short- and medium-term causes for the establishment of the Fujimorato. Second, I describe the political relations between center and periphery; that is, I include a spatial dimension of analysis instead of assuming national homogeneity (in terms of classes or political culture). Finally, I hope to move beyond purely society-centered explanations to incorporate the state and regime changes. I start by setting up the Tocquevillean framework in order to develop an empirical argument: that the establishment of the Fujimorato can be attributed to a historical process in which the central government gradually weakened peripheral elites, a process that permitted Fujimori to finally engulf the precarious periphery that otherwise would have resisted such an authoritarian and centralist project.

The Tocquevillean Framework

Latin Americans have rarely used the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville. When they have, their point of departure has been De la démocratie en Amérique (DA) (1840 [1981]) to study civil associations (Forment 2003), provide a social definition of democracy (Rouqué 2010), compare the region’s lack of democratic mores with the United States (Krauze 2000), or, more empirically, describe fears of a demoralized democracy in the Andes during the early 1990s (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 203-224). This chapter, instead, builds on Tocqueville’s L’Ancien régime et la révolution, ARR (1856 [1888]), a book that has received less attention in the study of Latin American politics.4

Two convictions link DA and ARR. First, there is the sociological conviction that in the modern world the differences between individuals and between social classes are narrowing; there is a path toward “sameness” (Welch 2006: 303). This natural propensity toward l’égalité des conditions is at the heart of the definition of democracy in Tocqueville.5 For the first time in the history of political thought, “democracy” became the distinctive modern political experience (Dunn 2005: 73). Second, there is a moral conviction: freedom is understood to be the exercise of self-government by a community of equal individuals (a republican definition). The Tocquevillean nightmare is a society that cedes control of its destiny to another party, especially the state, which then absorbs the political life of society in order to place it in the hands of bureaucrats. Bureaucrats do tend to minimize differences in social status among individuals, bringing equality, but unless a vigorous society is able to constrain its ambitions, the state could also bring tyranny. Though bureaucratic rule may minimize inequality, it is tyrannical if society retains no political decision-making power, instead delegating it to the state.

In DA, Tocqueville depicts a country in which egalitarian tendencies go hand in hand with the institutions of freedom, while in ARR he portrays a France in which the equalizing forces of the central state are not accompanied by any freedoms. The difference between the countries, according to Tocqueville, comes less from their democratic character (the existence of l’égalité des conditions) than from the freedom they enjoy. For Tocqueville, a democratic country might be free or tyrannical.6 In his terms, a democratic tyranny was not at all an
oxymoron. Theoretically, he was already well equipped to understand a phenomenon like the popular autocrat Fujimori.

While the tension between liberty and equality remains his central concern in both books, Tocqueville’s theoretical framework varies. In DA, he focuses mainly on American society in order to understand the political system; in ARR, he examines the French regime through state institutions.

In a comparative analytical analysis, Tocqueville shows how the French state, in the long run, succeeded in dividing the French social classes and eroding the social pouvoirs intermédiaires and their capacity to self-govern. In temporal terms, in ARR Tocqueville links long- and short-term causes to explain the French Revolution. He divides the book into three sections: the first one describes the object of his study (the French Revolution); the second depicts the root causes of the revolution, and the third, the more proximate factors. For Tocqueville it would be equally wrong to derive the revolution directly either from the historical factors or from the proximate causes (Aron 1967: 282).

In this chapter I do not apply Tocqueville to the Peruvian case. Instead, I build on his main political and normative concern: that democratic societies could embrace tyranny. The *Fujimorato* was a sort of Tocquevillian creature. I intend to explain its emergence by projecting a film shot through a Tocquevillian lens. This pushes me to highlight and trace the relationship between the development of the state (the process that Tocqueville calls centralisation administrative) and political life in the periphery, its political elites, and its political organizations (which play the role of pouvoirs intermédiaires in Tocqueville’s ARR). I try to establish with an eye for moments of regime change: the switching between democracy and authoritarianism and the permanence of those regimes had lasting consequences for both the state and the periphery. Second, I see the process of democratization as a process toward légalité des conditions. Finally, I divide my analysis temporally, like Tocqueville in ARR and, following Braudel (1958), I call the two moments histoire conjoncturelle (Peru post-1956) and histoire événementielle (Peru during the 1990s). Therefore, in this article I combine the main Tocquevillian normative concerns with a set of tools (theoretical and temporal) inspired by ARR in order to build an alternative framework for a discussion of the *Fujimorato*.

The Tocquevillian Puzzle

I will frame the Tocquevillian puzzle by relating three junctures that show the political relationship between the peripheral powers and the central state during the twentieth century.

First Juncture

When Colonel Sánchez Cerro’s 1930 revolt in the southern city of Arequipa ousted President Augusto B. Leguía, the South seized Leguía’s downfall as an opportunity to start a decentralizing project. The Nationalist Agrarian Party and the Decentralist Party were founded in Cuzco and Arequipa, respectively. The former proposed a program “based on regional powers, with autonomy for the collection and administration of their revenues” (Rénéque 1991: 120). The two parties merged during the presidential campaign of 1931 to become the Southern Decentralist Party (PDS). Sánchez Cerro’s decision to run for reelection led him to mobilize: David Samanez Ocampo, from Cuzco, established a Junta de Gobierno in Arequipa and Sánchez Cerro headed one in Lima. In this turbulent context, Samanez traveled to the capital to take over the government. Despite the brevity of his rule, Samanez and his collaborators implemented several decentralist policies. Though chaos soon swept his junta out of power, the Southern decentralists supported José María de la Jara in the general elections of 1931 and obtained 33 of the 145 seats at the Constituent Assembly of 1931–1932.

Second Juncture

Between 1945 and 1956, regional tensions again marked Peruvian politics. Although the government of Bustamante y Rivero (1945–1948) took power with APR’s support, its southern leadership and strong electoral support in Arequipa maintained southern hegemony (Caravedo 1978: 144). The Bustamante y Rivero government promoted “industrialist” economic policies (Portocarrero 1983: 66), which were reversed by General Odría after the 1948 coup in favor of an agro-export development strategy that benefited large estates in northern Peru. The content of national debate was not only ideological but also regionalist. This tension continued throughout Odría’s authoritarian regime (1948–1956). In 1955, the Southern leader Roger Cáceres won a hotly contested election for president of the Federación Universitaria del Perú, beating the candidates of national parties such as APR and the Communist Party; a southern-based Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC) was created; and, finally, anti-Odría protests in Arequipa in December 1955 led to the call for elections to take place the following year. Taking advantage of the new moment, the PDC won 90 percent of the parliamentary seats from Arequipa in the 1956 elections. At different levels, central power in this juncture was constrained by peripheral actors.
Third Juncture

In 2000, Vladimiro Montesinos sat in the offices of the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) before two congressmen of the Cáceres Velásquez family, formerly a member of the southern elites that included Roger Cáceres. They agreed to join Fujimori's coalition in exchange for ten thousand US dollars despite having been elected as part of the opposition. Two years earlier, Dionisio Romero, Peru's richest man and former porte-parole of agro-export interests from the Peruvian North, had also sat with Montesinos in the same place to ensure Fujimori's reelection in 2000. These are very Tocquevillean scenes: the central state, embodied by a powerful police captain, quietly subjugaates formerly strong regional-peripheral leaders.

What happened between the first two junctures when northern and southern elites were able to challenge the central state, and this final episode in which the state brought these once-peripheral elites to their knees? This chapter tells that story.


The main issue in Peruvian politics in the mid-twentieth century was the creation of a democracy, which meant the incorporation of millions of people to the polity and, therefore, to put an end to a polity divided into citizens and subordinates. Some Latin American countries addressed incorporation in the first half of the twentieth century (Collier and Collier 1991 [2006]), but the Andean countries lagged behind the challenge presented by the vast indigenous rural populations (Drinot 2011). Peru tried to solve the issue constitutionally for a decade and then turned to military action. The main policy instrument in the debate was land reform, which was crucial to the political dynamic between the periphery and the central government.

Two types of elites inhabited the Peruvian periphery in the mid-twentieth century: oligarchic and anti-oligarchic elites. Here I consider as actors those peripheral elites who held strategic positions that allowed them to influence national and regional politics frequently and substantially. It is important to emphasize that, in contrast to a classicist or Marxist taxonony, these categories of "peripheral elites" combine spatial and ideological elements. The peripheral-oligarchic elite was linked to large agro-export estates in the North, to the power of gomonales and to traditional agriculture in the highlands and the South. What united them in this case was not their relationship with a "mode of production," but a peripheral position and a conservative outlook on the oligarchic political system. Their interests influenced state institutions, especially strategic ministries and the Senate.

The peripheral anti-oligarchic elite was opposed to traditional power structures. Socially, this anti-oligarchic elite resulted from the expansion of urban centers and, in some cases, the modernization of agriculture (Klarén 1973). Ideologically, it aimed to overturn "colonial legacies" perpetuated by unequal land distribution and persistent precapitalist labor relations. While peripheral oligarchic elites exerted their influence through traditional corporate organizations, the anti-oligarchic elites expressed theirs with modern political parties. Starting in the 1930s, APRA became a strong party primarily based in northern Peru (Taylor 2000). In the South, especially during the second half of the century, southern elites provided an important support base for national reformist parties such as Acción Popular (AP) and Democracia Cristiana (Plasas 1996; Vergara 2012).

The prevailing regime determined the political strength of these elites. During authoritarian closures, the peripheral oligarchic elite expressed their interests easily, while the anti-oligarchic elite found their platform of expression, modern political parties, expelled from the public sphere. Thus each regime change created winners and losers.

In the 1945 general elections, the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite was given an opportunity to validate its reform program at the polls. The national organizations with the support of the north and south branches of the anti-oligarchic elite supported the candidacy of Bustamante y Rivero (from Arequipa) and his Frente Democrático Nacional, obtaining a massive 66.9 percent of the vote. The alliance of the regional branches paved the way for a definitive victory for the reformist agenda, as is evident from the results for the most important provinces in the North and South. After three years of unstable governments, a new coup interrupted Bustamante's democratic government. The return of elections in 1956 following eight years of dictatorship under General Odria forced elites to establish strategies consistent with the new climate of political openness in order to participate in public affairs (table 2.1).

For the peripheral oligarchic elite, accustomed to having social influence on authoritarian governments, elections compelled them to represent ideas and constituencies and to build new political organizations. The peripheral anti-oligarchic elite, on the other hand, had the opportunity to reintroduce its reformist program interrupted in 1948. Nevertheless, in 1956, the two branches of the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite did not combine forces as they had 11 years before. In the 1956
Table 2.1 1945 presidential results by departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>FDN</th>
<th>UR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arequipa</td>
<td>75.89</td>
<td>24.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callao</td>
<td>79.22</td>
<td>20.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuzco</td>
<td>62.16</td>
<td>37.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>84.41</td>
<td>15.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>39.40</td>
<td>60.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.2 1956 general election results by departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>MDP</th>
<th>FNJD</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arequipa</td>
<td>32.44</td>
<td>58.37</td>
<td>9.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callao</td>
<td>60.80</td>
<td>27.85</td>
<td>11.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuzco</td>
<td>25.83</td>
<td>57.27</td>
<td>16.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>63.99</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>13.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>25.66</td>
<td>44.21</td>
<td>30.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>42.58</td>
<td>41.23</td>
<td>16.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The presidency of Manuel Prado allowed the periphery two channels of influence over the central government. One was the de facto influence of the established elites that had prevailed during the military government of Odria (1948–1956) and persisted under the elected president. The peripheral oligarchic elite enjoyed a strong presence through organizations such as the Sociedad Nacional Agraria (SNA) and placed many members, like Pedro Beltrán, the classic face of Peruvian liberalism, in state positions. Especially in the North, land-owning sugar and cotton producers enjoyed great power in government. On the other hand, as described by Mannrique (1995), the southern gamonalas maintained their power through permanent representation in Congress.

The new democratic moment empowered the peripheral anti-oligarchic elites and its parties. The Democracia Cristiana (DC) and the Movimiento Social Cristiano, with strong bases in Arequipa (Planas 1996); the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos (FRENATRACA), headed by Roger Cáceres Velásquez in the city of Juliaca in Puno (Rénique 2004: 157–167); and the adoption of belaúndismo among the business elite in Cuzco (Rénique 1991: 159), all strengthened the anti-oligarchic position. These movements confirmed that democratic institutions fueled the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite, detached from APRA, in their reformist, regionalist projects.

Nonetheless, the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite faced two hurdles to enacting democratic reforms. First, presidential and parliamentary elections did not provide sufficient political space to develop a more comprehensive political project. Given the new conditions of political competition, the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite was a minority at the national level up against the oligarchic options and their new ally, APRA. To gain influence, this southern-based anti-oligarchic elite needed decentralized institutional and electoral spaces—such as municipal and regional elections—where they could consolidate political power. Second, and perhaps more important, the literacy
requirement that prevented most campesinos from voting was an insurmountable barrier for the anti-oligarchic elite. Indigenous advocates during the 1920s and 1930s had already faced this challenge: how to succeed in the electoral arena with a reform agenda whose principal and potential beneficiaries could not vote.²⁰

After his surprising second-place finish to Prado in 1956, Fernando Belaúnde set out to build a national political party by traveling through Peru. The strategy paid off. After a military intervention in the 1962 elections that prevented APRA's founding leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, from taking office after a close presidential race,²¹ Belaúnde won the next election. Thus the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite came to power through Belaúnde's Acción Popular (AP).²² APRA took the second place. However, the north and south remained electorally divided, as tables 2.3 and 2.4 show.

The legislative arena also demonstrates that the southern peripheral anti-oligarchic elite largely supported Belaúnde's party. In 1963, only one of Cuzco's 11 elected congressional representatives belonged to Odría's Unión Nacional Odrista (UNO), the vehicle of the oligarchic elite, while 7 were from AP/DC and the rest from APRA.²³ Thus, ten of Cuzco's representatives represented the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite, with the majority from AP. Only 3 of the 11 were landowners; the rest were lawyers, academics, and engineers. That two of the three landowners were from AP suggests that they were the most "modern," as AP openly supported land reform.²⁴

### Table 2.3 1963 general election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>UNO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Belaúnde</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Odría</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Samamé</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Tuesta (1994), Compiled by the author.*

### Table 2.4 1963 general election results by departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>APRA</th>
<th>UNO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arequipa</td>
<td>58.27</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>24.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callao</td>
<td>33.02</td>
<td>25.98</td>
<td>40.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuzco</td>
<td>64.34</td>
<td>19.96</td>
<td>15.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>13.45</td>
<td>75.26</td>
<td>10.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>36.69</td>
<td>24.47</td>
<td>38.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>24.47</td>
<td>26.89</td>
<td>31.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Tuesta (1994), Compiled by the author.*

The main Tocquevillian point in this story is that the political processes in Peru have an important peripheral component. Peripheral elites, in their oligarchic or anti-oligarchic fashion, were strong enough to impact national politics through different channels. There existed what Tocqueville called the pouvoirs intermédiaires. Those peripheral powers clashed over the classic Tocquevillian theme of the replacement of the ancien régime with a democratic polity. These peripheral, antagonistic forces were strong enough to both shape national politics and policies and, after Belaúnde implemented local elections, to dominate their own regions. As mentioned above, this allowed AP and APRA (the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite) to expand their power in their regions. As the 1964 provincial mayoral elections in Cuzco, Arequipa, and La Libertad illustrate, the establishment of municipal elections that redistributed power to the provinces strengthened the parties of anti-oligarchic elites (see tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7).

These electoral results suggest that José Carlos Mariátegui's fear that decentralization would perpetuate ganonalismo was no longer accurate since it was reinforcing the power of the explicitly antiganonalismo elites and parties.²⁵

On the other hand, the arrival of AP to national executive power changed the traditional makeup of the presidential cabinet. While members of the peripheral or limeno (central) oligarchic elite were dominant in government ministries during both the authoritarian rule of General Odría and Manuel Prado's presidency, Belaúnde favored reformers. For example, the ministers of agriculture—a key position

### Table 2.5 Elected party in municipalities of Cuzco in 1964 municipal elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Political alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuzco</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acomayo</td>
<td>APRA-UNO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anta</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calca</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
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<td>Canas</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canchis</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espinar</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Convención</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paruro</td>
<td>Frente Democrático Independiente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pucará</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quispicanchi</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uribamba</td>
<td>AP-DC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Tuesta (1994), Compiled by the author.*
exports declined, falling from 47 percent to only 16 percent of total exports between 1955 and 1969.27

Like any regime change, the advent of electoral democracy in 1956 created winners and losers. Though the peripheral oligarchic elite initially maintained the influence they had during the Odría dictatorship, the 1963 elections and the establishment of municipal elections in 1964 diminished their power in both central and regional arenas. Meanwhile, these same events provided a major boost to the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite. The two institutional reforms considered here—the return of democracy and the establishment of municipal elections—activated social and political forces that promised a less Lima-centered political life. They invigorated the regional periphery so that it now coordinated and exercised national-level power. However, Belaúnde could not overcome the alliance of APRA and the oligarchic elites to pass the promised land reform. Lack of space prevents me from exploring this in detail, but its enduring consequence was the silent conviction that reform would not occur by constitutional means. The duty of defeating the ancien régime and establishing a modern regime of égalité des conditions no longer belonged to democratic elites; now it fell to revolutionary elites. The question was whether they would be Marxist or military.

**Histoire conjoncturelle I: The Centralization Administrative and the Peripheral Marginal Elite**

—The invasion is led by my nephew—the woman said.
—But then, were there relatives of the owners among the peasant leaders?
—Yes, my nephew is a college student. His name is Vladimiro.28

While elites struggled for power, another Tocquevillean process occurred: the expansion of state capacity. Thanks to the post–World War II economic boom, the state could strengthen its centralization administrative. As it is impossible to cover all dimensions along which the Peruvian state increased capacity, I focus mainly on higher education. Here, the newly invigorated state had the unexpected effect of facilitating the emergence of a new, important, provincial actor: the peripheral marginal elite.29

Between 1917 and 1955, not a single university was established in Peru. Suddenly, during the democratic opening (1955–1969), 24 universities opened in an unquestionable boom. Eleven of these were in Lima and 15 were public. This state expansion into higher
education had an important democratizing effect. Universities represented two great hopes for the Peruvian provinces. First, they promised meritocracy. Professional education would be accessible in the periphery itself, not just to those who travelled to Lima, Arequipa, or Trujillo. Additionally, the university arrived with doctrines of radical egalitarianism, in particular, all branches of socialism, and the promise of changing the country. The university agenda was not scientific or contemplative, but active and political. The egalitarian discourse they produced corroded “traditional relations between classes, genders and generations” (Degregori 1990: 143). The outstanding example is the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga, reopened in 1959, where a strike for free tuition in the late 1960s established the basis for Sendero Luminoso. Education was a tool for change. Actually, the change was the university itself. The greatest effect of the new universities was the creation of a new elite whose legitimacy came from knowledge and who could promote radical social change in the periphery (de la Cadena 1999). This new university elite was a new social layer that challenged the central government and the existing peripheral elite factions.

The national periphery prior to Velasco’s 1969 agrarian reform was going through a time of change as it restructured its ties to the center and internal social relations in the provinces. Both inwardly and outwardly, the periphery had elements of autonomy and created spaces from which to challenge centralized authority. However, the 1956–1968 period saw more success in developing institutions incorporating peripheral actors than in creating the social conditions (les égalité des conditions) of a modern democracy. Literacy requirements continued to exclude indigenous masses and opponents used constitutional channels to undermine long-awaited land reforms, fuelling frustration. On the grounds of égalité des conditions, a coup in 1968 eliminated the freedoms and institutions that empowered the periphery and its elites to influence the central level. In an indisputable Tocquevillian dilemma, the longed-for social democracy buried institutional democracy.

**Histoire conjoncturelle II: Reform from Above; Imposing l’égaleité des conditions, 1968–1980**

Velasco’s coup in 1968 established a “revolution from above” (Trinberger 1978) or an “organic-statist experiment” (Stepan 1978) and dismantled the emerging democratic institutions that had given the Peruvian periphery a voice. The military government was “anti-oligarchic,” and pushed aside the peripheral oligarchic elite even more firmly than Belaúnde so that it disappeared from the Peruvian state. The best example is the Prado family (see Portocarrero 2008). Former President Manuel Prado met Velasco to present himself as an example of just the kind of progressive Peruvian bourgeoisie that was needed, distinct from the traditional and backward landowners. Although Prado’s self-analysis was correct, Velasco dismissed Prado outright, since he was “the living symbol of the oligarchy, the sign of an era that just had to be left behind. It was absolutely necessary to establish a distance from those groups that by their very presence suggested continuity or connivance of any kind” (Portocarrero 2008: 232). Oligarchic elites in the periphery suffered the same fate. This exclusion hastened the decline of both the already-fading ganonal and the more industrialized agricultural estates on the coast. The once-powerful SNA did not survive (Neira 1996); in 1972, the government banned it and confiscated its properties. When the soldiers who had once provided protection turned on them, the oligarchic peripheral elite panicked. Some of the barons migrated to the center, exchanging land for industry. An example is the Grupo Romero; from all-powerful northern cotton farmers they became bankers based in Lima. At the end of his life, Velasco proudly recalled: “In my government we’ve beaten up the oligarchy in such a way that we’ve destroyed it.”

The transparent ideology of a military government wary of any elite or social force that was not military in nature also damaged the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite. Velasco and his generals were inherently suspicious of any political participation, only valuing technocratic and military knowledge and developing a “no-party” thesis (McClintock 1983). Anti-oligarchic parties remained outside of political life during the 12 years of military governance. The suspension of elections also halted the process of decentralization that began under Belaúnde in the 1960s and resulted in the reformist, peripheral elite who had worked their way into administrative positions in the provinces being replaced by the military cadres of the “new strategic elite” (Stepan 1978). The Peruvian regime was one of the most military-technocratic experiments in the world, leaving little room for non-military authorities. For 12 years, the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite was shut out of political space. Velasco even deprived them of their key political platforms, reformism and democratization, annihilating them in the ideological realm.

During Velasco’s rule, the creation of new provincial universities ceased (figure 2.1); however, those previously established remained open and became more radical. There flourished the peripheral
On the other hand, the *centralization administrative* led to greater equality of citizens while putting an end to the old regime. The result of the centralist and technocratic experiment was that individuals were more socially equal but excluded from political decision making. Suddenly, the only political impulses from the periphery were those from the marginal elite who—unlike the others—were driven by the doctrine universities had introduced to the provinces: revolution.

**Histoire conjoncturelle III: Ballots and Bullets, 1980–1990**

In 1980, Peru achieved its long-awaited goal of a universally constituted polity. After more than a century of political exclusion, illiterates could vote. Nearly a million indigenous people entered national politics. Here, I put forward some hypotheses for understanding the establishment of the Fujimorato and suggest that the 1980s witnessed the essential Tocquevillian tension between equality and liberty. The reforms promoted by the Velasco regime moved the country toward the *égalité des conditions* but the institutions that could provide liberty were also dismantled during the Velasco years. This disjunction would have disastrous consequences.

Table 2.8 indicates that in several regions, the incorporation of illiterates represented a significant increase in the number of voters that provided some short-term benefits to AP. AP had not participated in the 1978 Constituent Assembly, which explains, in part, why leftists won nearly a third of the seats. But in 1980 when AP again stood in elections and illiterate Peruvians voted for the first time, the leftist share of the vote fell by half. Fernando Belaúnde (the AP candidate) won in many of the country’s most depressed provinces that also included the newly enfranchised voters. Despite AP’s strong showing, its links to voters remained very weak after 12 years of military government. When the masses joined the electoral game, the existing political institutions failed to integrate them properly. The political parties lacked time to form links with these masses while corporate-class institutions failed to channel indigenous participation. The newly enfranchised citizens were spread across the territory with very few regional or national organizations to organize them. The ties of the *ancien régime* had vanished without any other order successfully replacing them (McClintock 1984). The institutional and bureaucratic government of the armed forces had not made room for any kind of political freedom in the regions. New citizens were increasingly equal and isolated from each other. Though administrative centralization was a blessing for equality, it was a curse for freedom.
Table 2.8 Literate and illiterate voters at the departmental level in 1980 (percentage of total departmental electors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>lliterate No.</th>
<th>lliterate %</th>
<th>Literate No.</th>
<th>Literate %</th>
<th>Total Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apurimac</td>
<td>42,209</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>43,051</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>85,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica</td>
<td>47,125</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>55,642</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>102,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
<td>60,511</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>84,289</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>144,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puno</td>
<td>107,017</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>177,929</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>284,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuzco</td>
<td>92,999</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>165,094</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>258,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huánuco</td>
<td>35,542</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>99,503</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>135,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>64,487</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>202,739</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>267,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancash</td>
<td>65,616</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>221,239</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>286,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>15,450</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>52,749</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>68,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junín</td>
<td>44,884</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>281,828</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>326,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madre de Dios</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7,608</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>8,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>46,109</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3,213,393</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>3,275,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moquegua</td>
<td>4,680</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>33,090</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>37,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Martín</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7,608</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>8,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacna</td>
<td>5,837</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>49,720</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>54,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>33,689</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>288,219</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>321,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arequipa</td>
<td>25,978</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>286,276</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>312,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>17,221</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>222,880</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>240,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loreto</td>
<td>9,916</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>159,572</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>169,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ica</td>
<td>8,006</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>193,627</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>201,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>75,090</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2,272,719</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>2,347,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callao</td>
<td>5,504</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>218,435</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>223,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumbes</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>33,944</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>34,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Total</td>
<td>832,846</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>5,598,775</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>6,431,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The lack of institutional channels was not the only challenge to mass incorporation in 1980. In that year, the Shining Path launched its Guerra Popular. It was the most radical challenge that the Peruvian periphery posed to the center (de la Cadena 2004). The political violence of the 1980s deepened the fragmentation of the Peruvian periphery by opening rifts between old anti-oligarchic elites and their parties and also, perhaps more importantly, between IU, the new and successful leftist block in Peruvian politics, and the peasant masses. The periphery was less a democratic territory than a war zone during the 1980s. The militarization of much of the country's interior prevented the seeds of democracy from germinating (Burt 2009). Despite the democratic regime at the national level, two-thirds of the country’s provinces ended up under military command (Rénique 2003: 97) and as Muñoz (2005: 33) has noted, electoral practices suffered due to absenteeism in the departments with the highest incidence of violence. Authoritarian enclaves predominated in areas where power remained out of the hands of ordinary citizens.

The ephemeral decentralization experiment beginning in 1988 illustrated the increasing weakness of the Peruvian periphery. In 1988, a Regionalization Law established 11 regions with elected assemblies tasked with electing regional presidents. These complex reforms went into effect in 1989, but failed almost immediately when many provinces and departamentos refused to assimilate into regions. Crucially, after more than a decade of military government followed by another decade of economic crisis and a bloody war, there was no longer any peripheral elite to take advantage of this new institutional platform. Though the IU prevailed in the elections, it lacked the cadres and organization to make use of its victories and exercise power in a violent and economically volatile context. While political reform might have activated important political actors, it could not invent them and their absence left a political vacuum in the provinces.

In short, at the end of the 1980s, Peru’s periphery was a political wasteland after the disappearance of traditional oligarchic ties and the loss of legitimacy of the anti-oligarchic elite parties after a decade of disastrous rule that eroded their already weak links to society. Further, the territory was wracked by political violence and then immersed in a crisis related to the end of Velasco’s cooperative experiment from 20 years before. Cooperatives were dismantled and thousands of agricultural smallholdings were established, condemning thousands of peasants to poverty and increased social and political fragmentation. The scene resembled the famous picture of a sack of potatoes that Karl Marx used to portray the French countryside in the nineteenth century. The periphery had lost its traditional elite, experienced increasing citizen equality in terms of landholdings, and witnessed the delegation of political life in several departments to the central administration’s coercive apparatus to confront guerrillas who attacked any legal left movement seeking to organize the fragmented countryside. The periphery had reached its most precarious and vulnerable moment.


When Alberto Fujimori swore the presidential oath on July 28, 1990, no one could have foreseen the course that Peru would take over the next decade. Nonetheless, a hint of the future haunted the ceremony: the regional presidents recently elected in 1989 were not
invited (Planas 1998: 565). Adolfo Saloma, Regional President of the Región Inca (integrated by the departamentos of Apurímac, Cuzco and Madre de Dios) said: “Fujimori just ignored us.” Centralist ideology was not the only reason for ignoring the regional presidents. Rather, the crisis in the periphery and the precariousness of the elites in charge created incentives to act in a centralist manner. We could say that by the beginning of the 1990s it was clear that amid such a crisis the Peruvian periphery lacked what Ziblatt (2006) calls infrastructural subnational power. It was apparent to the central state, as in the Tocquevillian nightmare, that its duty was to return order to regions that—due to the processes already discussed—lacked the means to engage in any form of self-government. Therefore, a crucial part of the explanation for Fujimori’s authoritarianism lies in this lack of power and capacity in the Peruvian periphery; the weak periphery provided no constraints to Fujimori’s intentions. A long historical process encouraged the final blow that helped establish an authoritarian and highly centralist regime.

Fujimori was a second and final period of Velasco’s project as far as the Peruvian periphery’s political life is concerned. Though ideological opposites, both regimes embodied centralization administrative by imposing themselves from above with the support of the armed forces. While Velasco eliminated innovative local forms of political participation, Fujimori used a series of political maneuvers to eliminate the decentralization process begun in the 1980s. First, he canceled the tax that had provided regions their revenue (e.g., impuesto selectivo al consumo). Overnight he ceased to convene the Consejo Presidencial de Coordinación Regional and, in Congress, he pitted regional governments against municipal counterparts (Planas 1998). Finally, with the autogolpe of April 5, 1992, Fujimori dissolved the regional governments along with all the major democratic institutions. No social actor in the periphery came out in their defense. The breakdown of democracy was closely intertwined with the definitive failure of the decentralist attempt.

After the coup, Fujimori radically reshaped the institutional distribution of power in the country. He built a highly centralist authoritarian regime with the acquiescence and applause of the population. Fujimori took advantage of and exacerbated the fragmentation and weakness of the Peruvian periphery. This attempt can be rapidly traced in three realms. First, the redistribution of power among levels of government through a “divide and conquer” strategy; second, the reallocation of power at the national legislature; and third, the deployment of vast central clientelistic social policies.

Having dispensed with the regional governments, Fujimori had to master the municipalities. His main challengers during the 1990s were the mayors of Lima—Ricardo Belmunt in the first half of the 1990s and Alberto Andrade in the second. This clash convinced the Fujimori government that it had to weaken provincial municipal governments while promoting district municipalities. To do this Fujimori took many steps: equalizing the traditional provincial and district levels of government in the 1993 constitution; stripping autonomous funds from provincial governments; and favoring the two thousand district-level municipalities by giving them new—but not autonomous—funds such as the Fondo de Compensación Municipal (FONCOMUN). That is, Fujimori created a sea of small islands completely dependent on the central government (Muñoz 2005).

Fujimori had an autocrat’s dream of a fragmented population with no elites, following the collapse of parties, to resist him. Under these conditions the government deployed vast clientelistic programs to bring some relief to those suffering the worst effects of his neoliberal reforms but, simultaneously, binding them in dependence and building what had to prove an enduring loyalty between those sectors and Fujimori himself. The central state deliberately weakened all the social programs linked to municipalities, NGOs, and the Church (Burt 2004) so as to unite the dispersed and enfranchised people of the 1970s and 1980s under the umbrella of neo-populism in the 1990s (Roberts 1995). The provinces with the greatest percentage of enfranchised people were the places where the Fujimori administration was obliged to invest more resources to cover them under the mantle of a paternalist state. The five provinces where enfranchisement was greatest (Apurímac, Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Cuzco, and Puno) were, not coincidentally, the five provinces where the central government preferentially deployed assistance programs, especially the redistribution of resources to municipalities through the already mentioned FONCOMUN. In addition, programs such as Fondo de Compensación de Desarrollo Social (FONCODES), Programa Nacional de Alimentos (PRONAA), and the Programa Nacional de Manejo de Cuencas Hídricas (PRONAMACH) and Fondo Nacional de Vivienda (FONAVI) acted in that same manner. Millions of people with neither subnational ties nor political parties to organize resistance were courted by a clientelistic Leviathan happy to establish an uneven link with a mass of individuals with no ties to one another.

An additional realm where the periphery was mercilessly defected was the national legislature. Along with the regional governments,
Fujimori had dissolved the bicameral Congress. When the legislature reopened its doors in 1995, the total number of representatives had been reduced from 240 to 120 and the chamber based on territorial representation was dissolved forever. To make matters worse, the new single chamber was elected in a single national district that caused an abrupt decline of provincial importance in national politics. The single electoral district system encouraged congressional candidates (and congressmen once elected) to concentrate their work in Lima. As Degregori and Meléndez (2007: 64) suggest: “In a system that re-imposes the single national district, national representation is far from territorial representation. Rather than channeling specific regional or social demands, or being national political representatives, parliamentarians are, above all, ‘men and women of the President’ (one of them even defined himself as ‘soldier of Fujimori’).” Candidates elected from the provinces to Fujimori’s parliament became courtiers. They were not representatives of any peripheral elite, but individuals with education in state universities, mainly in science, especially engineering, who decided to support the authoritarian project. Never before had the Peruvian periphery so clearly been a bystander in national politics. The few politicians from the regions had to become limoneros in order to survive since their native regions had no demographic weight to challenge the capital that had a third of the national population. During the 1990s, politics became more centralized than ever. All power was in the hands of the central government and forms of peripheral representation were drastically weakened. And, finally, the Shining Path—which David Scott Palmer once called “the most recent manifestation of a historic pattern in Peru of periodic organization at the periphery in opposition to the center” (1986: 140)—was totally defeated, leaving behind a periphery in which civil forces had drastically been punished by violence for more than a decade.

This explanation seeks to show the implications of the short- and long-term causes that my Tocquevillian framework proposed. As Raymond Aron said about the Tocquevillian approach to the causes of the French Revolution, neither the structural nor accidental causes alone could explain the outcome. In the same vein, only the confluence of distant and proximate causes accounts for Fujimori’s authoritarianism. Though Fujimori had agency in deciding to build a centralist and authoritarian regime, he could only do so because his opponents, especially the periphery, were easy prey after a long period of weakening. They were ready to fall and he just gave the final push. By the mid-1990s, no ganonal or landlord could challenge Fujimori on behalf of his own interests, much less in the name of democratic principles; the anti-oligarchic elite and its representative parties had vanished; the Shining Path marginal elite were imprisoned or dead; and the radicalized universities that had enabled its emergence were controlled by the military. The periphery lacked solid political and social actors to defend their interests. A population tired of disorder and lacking social ties approved of the dominance of the central state. This Tocquevillian explanation—with its privileged variables and its temporal framework—suggests that rather than recentralizing the country, Fujimori continued a centralist project. Fujimori represents less a drastic breakdown than a crucial final step in a long process of weakening peripheral civil forces in the face of a gradually strengthening central state.

Conclusion

Let’s begin the end with a quote from 1992: “With the economy in virtual ruins, with Sendero knocking at the door, and with a new set of elected government leaders taking power, the only alternative to a further, possibly dramatic unification of elites operating the democratic regime appears to be the abyss” (Dietz 1992: 255). This diagnosis was accurate but failed to consider one detail: Peru lacked a strong democratic elite to resist the authoritarian abyss. Fujimori’s government could establish an authoritarian regime because those actors who, in principle, should have opposed the project did not do so. This was especially true of the old peripheral forces, who were already weakened. Historical conditions and short-term decisions were crucial to the peculiar emergence of an authoritarian regime in the midst of a democratizing international environment.

I hope to have shown how all the main players from the periphery that once counterbalanced the interests of the central state were in disarray before Fujimori emerged and eliminated them. In this strictly fundamental sense of a Tocquevillian policy, Fujimori was more the continuation of Velasco’s policies toward Peruvian civil society than an opposite. In addition, rather than seeing Fujimori’s policies as a radical change, this approach pushes us to see them as the continuation of a long process of state centralization. Translated into the Tocquevillian vocabulary, we have witnessed a country that simultaneously—and with no contradiction—democratized and moved toward tyranny. Our story confirms the worst of Tocqueville’s fears about modern state-society relations: a society that while no longer enslaved, was not free either.
Notes

* I would like to thank Paulo Drinot, Cheryl Welch, Graciela Ducatenezler, Claire Dupuy, Ricardo Vergara, José Luis Rénique, and Frederic Mérand for their comments on earlier versions of this article. I thank also the Trudeau Foundation for supporting this research.

2. With the term “fujimorato” I refer to the government of Alberto Fujimori between 1992 and 2000. I prefer to “Fujimorismo” since this term may also refer to Fujimori’s political movement, to a certain ideology, or even to a certain way of doing politics in Peru.
3. For an extensive review on the Fujimorato, see Vergara (2010).
4. An interesting and peculiar article using neither Tocqueville’s DA nor the ARR is Charles Reilly’s study of the Guatemalan democracy built on Tocqueville’s little-known *Journey in Ireland* (Reilly 2009).
5. Tocqueville never defines exactly what he means by “égalité de conditions” but Raymond Aron characterizes it as a situation in which “tous les individus qui composent la collectivité sont socialement égaux, ce qui ne signifie d’ailleurs pas intellectuellement égaux, ce qui serait absurde, ni économiquement égaux, ce qui, d’après Tocqueville serait impossible. L’égalité sociale signifie qu’il n’y a pas de différence héréditaire de conditions et que toutes les occupations, toutes les professions, toutes les dignités, tous les honneurs sont accessibles à tous” (Aron 1967: 225).
6. That is why Wolin (2001) states that Tocqueville is the first to think the “compromise” between democracy and freedom.
7. For an analysis of the internal structure of the ARR and of the theoretical and methodological changes in Tocqueville, see the masterly Paret (1979: 209–56). See also Elster (2011).
8. The famous Braudelian *longue durée* is beyond the scope of this chapter.
9. For example, price reductions in fertilizer and agricultural machinery; commissions to make proposals for decentralization (to dictate electoral rules, secret and compulsory voting, and representation of minorities). They opted for departmental rather than provincial representation since the provincial level would strengthen local landords. All these reforms permitted professionals, intellectuals, and merchants to reach a political body that had been mostly monopolized by provincial strongmen (Rénique 1991: 124–5).
10. It is impressive, actually, that given that the *Unión Revolucionaria* won 67 and APRA 29.
11. Rather than pinpointing these categories precisely, I use them in order to organize and understand political phenomena. They are ideal types. For ideal types, see Weber (1995). A third type of elite that I call “marginal peripheral” appears in the 1960s. I describe it later.
12. I adapt the definition from Higley and Gunther (1992: 8).

13. In this regard, the classification is also rooted in Weber. A similar classification strategy for revolutionary Mexico is offered in Knight (1985: 63–5).
15. See Cotler 1978 [2006].
16. Eloy Uteta, the candidate of the *Unión Revolucionaria*, gathered 33 percent of the vote.
17. The three years of the Bustamante government are beyond the scope of this chapter. See Portocarrero (1983).
19. This is stated by former president Valentín Paniagua who was a clear representative of what I call here the peripheral anti-oligarchic elite. See Paniagua’s interview in Dargent and Vergara (2010).
20. Here, the comparative perspective is very important to understand these processes: in Mexico, Benito Juárez, a president of Zapotec origin, granted Indians the right to vote in the mid-nineteenth century. In Bolivia, the national revolution of 1952 had enshrined the right to vote among the indigenous (and women); in Chile, this had happened in the late nineteenth century; in Argentina, the Sáenz Peña Law of 1912 enacted universal male voting. Late enfranchising in Peru is one of the reasons democracy has been more precarious than in other countries.
22. Fernando Belaúnde also had the support of major industrial groups such as Bentín, Ferreyros or Miró Quesada. However, I do not explore these groups in detail since they did not belong to the periphery.
23. *Acción Popular* and the *Democracia Cristiana* established an alliance in that election.
29. I take the idea of marginal elite from Skocpol (1979: 164–168), who argues that marginal elites in China, France, and Russia were key to revolutionary processes. These elites were formed by individuals arising under state institutions and usually prone to a radical project. A radical elite is composed of petty bureaucrats, solicitors, school or university teachers, and middle and upper ranges of the military.
32. For details on this point, see Vergara (2012: Ch. 4).
33. The political effects of such incorporation have not yet been studied in detail. Remy (2005) is an exception.
34. For details, see Vergara (2012: Ch. 5).
35. For the end of the land collectivization, see Mayer (2009: Ch. 5).
36. Personal interview.
37. In Arequipa, according to Professor Lozada Ballón, “only a couple of old politicians related to Democracia Cristiana protested. But in Arequipa no one said anything.” In Cusco, a former member of the Asamblea de la región Inca reminds that the day of the coup “people applauded like seals” (Carlos Barrenechea). Personal interviews from Vergara (2012).
39. For ideas discussed in this paragraph, see Muñoz (2005: 47–48).
40. Vergara (2012: Ch. 5).
41. See Annex I to Degregori and Meléndez (2007) for a great picture of this radical switch.
42. See Burt (2004).

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